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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The single issue presented for review is 
whether the trial judgi erred in granting a 
directed verdict at the end of plaintiffs' case 
without letting the issues be presented to the 
jury. 
MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes regarding traffic 
rules and regulations of the State of Utah are 
referred to by statute and number here and full 
copies of each Utah State statute is reproduced in 
Addendum "A," attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof: 
41-6-46 Speed Regulations 
41-6-53 and 41-6-54 Duty to Drive 
on Right Side of Highway 
41-6-61 Roadway Divided into Marked Lanes 
41-6-80 Vehicles to Exercise Due Care to 
Avoid Pedestrians 
41-6-118 Lights and Illuminating Devices 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the end of the two-day trial before the 
Court sitting with a jury, plaintiffs rested their 
case and defendants moved for a Rule 50 Directed 
Verdict on the grounds that plaintiffs had not 
proven a prima facie case. Judge David Sam 
granted the motion and dismissed the case without 
allowinq it to go to the jury. Appeal is made 
here from that dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by the appellant on 
behalf of himself and on behalf of himself as 
Guardian Ad Litem for his three minor children 
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seeking damages from the defendant for wrongful 
death of his wife and the mother of his children, 
she having been killed in a pedestrian/auto 
accident which occurred approximately 1L:00 p.m. 
on the 29th of May, 1982 on U.S. Highway 89, south 
and east of Kanab, Utah (see, trial transcript 
page 97 and deposition of Ida Tsosie Smith page 3 
through 9). 
The highway at that point consists of two 
12-foot traffic lanes with a dividing line down 
the center and a 6-foot wide parking lane on the 
right of each traffic lane with an approximate 
6-foot gravel shoulder (trial transcript page 91 
and 92). The road is straight and relatively flat 
for a substantial distance in both directions from 
point of the accident. 
The Sandovals were traveling in a four-wheel 
drive Blazer headed for Page, Arizona. The driver 
was Virginia Sandoval. She pulled off the road 
onto the gravel shoulder and parked the Blazer to 
allow the occupants of the vehicle to go to the 
bathroom. Since they had picked up a male 
hitchhiker, Virginal Sandoval exited the car on 
the driver's side and walked across the street, 
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while her husband and children went to the 
bathroom outside the right-hand side door of the 
car. The Blazer's emergency flashers were in 
operation. (See, trial transcript of recorded 
statement of Phil Ellsworth page 3.) 
Mrs. Sandoval started back toward the parked 
vehicle, entered the westbound lane of traffic 
where she stopped near the center line to allow 
the respondent's eastbound vehicle to pass. (See, 
trial transcript page 97-98.) 
Respondent, whose attention was on the 
parked vehicle, did not see the pedestrian 
standing in the street until instantaneously 
before impact. Her car was partly in the opposing 
lane of traffic, (see,, transcript page 141) and 
she hurriedly pulled her car to the right (see, 
transcript page 101). Mrs. Smith's vehicle was 
damaged around the left front headlight and the 
driver's side rearview mirror. (See, page 101 
trial transcript and Smith Deposition page 15.) 
Respondent was driving at the time at 
approximately 40-45 miles an hour, (see, trial 
transcript page 101) with her headlights on low 
beam (Smith deposition page 16). She had no 
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explanation and could give no reason why she did 
not see the pedestrian standing in the street 
(see, Smith deposition pages 21-22). The impact 
with the car threw Virginia Smith's body 40 to 45 
feet down the road (see, trial transcript page 36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER DUTY TO DRIVE AT 
A SAFE SPEED SO AS TO AVOID HAZARD TO PEDESTRIANS 
LAWFULLY ON THE ROAD. (U.C.A. 41-6-46) 
2. RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER STATUTORY DUTY 
TO DRIVE WITHIN THE RIGHT-HAND LANE OF TRAFFIC. 
(U.C.A. 40-6-53 and 41-6-54) 
3. RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER DUTY TO NOT 
DRIVE IN THE OPPOSING LANE OF TRAFFIC. (U.C.A. 
41-6-61) 
4. RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER STATUTORY DUTY 
AS A VEHICLE DRIVER TO EXERCISE DUE CARE AND TO 
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT. (U.C.A. 41-6-80) 
5. VIOLATION OF A STATUTORY TRAFFIC 
REGULATION CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF 
NEGLIGENCE. 
6. THE EVIDENCE WHEN TAKEN IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF PRECLUDES THE COURT 
ENTERING A JUDGMENT FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER DUTY TO DRIVE 
AT A SAFE SPEED SO AS TO AVOID HAZARD 
TO PEDESTRIANS LAWFULLY ON THE ROAD. 
Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Code, a portion 
of the Motor Vehicle Code dealing with speed 
regulations says in pertinent part: 
41-6-46(1) No person shall drive a 
vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then 
existing. Consistent with the 
foregoing, every person shall drive 
at a safe and appropriate speed when 
approaching and crossing an 
intersection or railroad grade 
crossing, when approaching or going 
around a curve, when approaching a 
hillcrest, when traveling upon any 
narrow or winding roadway, and when 
special hazards exist with respect to 
pedestrians or other traffic or by 
reason of weather or highway 
conditions. (Emphasis added.) 
The defendant/respondent Ida Tsosie Smith at 
trial of this matter testified that as she 
approached the location where the Sandoval car was 
parked off to the side of the road: 
All of a sudden just out of I don't 
know where it seemed like I blinked 
my eyes and there was somebody in 
front of me and right at that time 
there was a car coming ahead too 
facing me with a high beam that kinda 
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blinded me too and not knowing what I 
was seeing there for a while but the 
minute I saw my daughter scream and I 
saw somebody standing there or 
something I said anyway I hurried and 
swerved my car to my right to avoid 
this object in the road. (Trial 
transcript pages 97,98.) 
Mrs, Smith had testified in her deposition 
that she did not see the pedestrian until she was 
approximately three feet from her. She changed 
that testimony at the trial and testified that she 
saw the pedestrian first when only a car length 
from her. See, trial transcript page 100. 
With respect to her speed, Mrs. Smith 
testified that she had been traveling 45 miles and 
hour and that when she saw the parked car she 
reduced to 40 miles an hour, Seer trial transcript 
page 101, but that at the speed she was going she 
could do nothing but attempt to turn to the right 
but that attempt was too late to avoid collision 
with the stationary pedestrian. 
Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Code quoted 
above has been the recent subject of discussion in 
the case of Apache Tank Lines Inc. v. Cheney v. 
Cowboy Oily 18 Utah Advance Reports 19 (Supreme 
Court No. 19573, filed September 20, 1985). 
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Apache Tank Lines v. Cheney was a very similar 
case to this one in that it is an action by 
surviving family members for the wrongful death of 
Mrs. Cheney. 
In discussion of 41-6-46 on page 21 of the 
Apache casef the Court remarked: 
Whether Brunson breached the conduct 
imposed by the statute was a question 
for the jury. From the evidence 
before the trial court a jury could 
reasonably find that Brunson was 
driving too fast for existing 
hazardous conditions; that he was 
overdriving the area illuminated by 
his trucks two low-beam headlights; 
and that he was fatigued, took no 
evasive action and failed to keep a 
proper lookout. The trial court 
invaded the province of the jury when 
it granted Brunson and Cowboy Oil 
Company summary judgment. 
The case was remanded for a new trial on the 
merits. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER STATUTORY 
DUTY TO DRIVE WITHIN THE RIGHT-HAND 
LANE OF TRAFFIC. 
Section 41-6-53 of the Utah Code mandates 
that it is the duty of a driver upon all roadways 
of sufficient width to drive upon the right half 
of the roadway except under certain specified 
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conditions, none of which have any application 
here. 
Section 41-6-54 provides: 
Drivers of vehicles proceeding in 
opposite direction shall pass each 
other to the right and upon roadways 
having width for not more than one 
line of traffic in each direction 
each driver shall give to the other 
at least one-half of the main 
traveled portion of the roadway as 
nearly as possible. 
In the scenario before the trial court, the 
respondent driver, Mrs. Smith, approached an area 
where she observed off to the right of her a car 
parked on the shoulder of the highway. She 
simultaneously observed a vehicle approaching from 
the opposite direction. See, trial transcript 
page 97. Mrs. Smith was asked (trial transcript 
page 98): 
q) Where was the pedestrian standing 
in the road? 
a) I would say right in the middle 
and she was not running across or 
nothing she just stood there with her 
hands up like this (ind) in front of 
me. 
In response to the same question she 
responded later (trial transcript page 99). 
q) Where was she with respect to the 
center line of the road? 
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a) Well I really couldn't say. It 
is in the middle, the light hitting 
in my face with the oncoming car but 
if I would move over a little bit she 
was just right even with my left 
wheel of my car ... 
q) So you don't know where you were 
or where she was with respect to the 
center line? 
a) Somewhere right there in the 
middle anyway (trial transcript page 
99) . 
Again later in cross-examination the 
following exchange took place (trial transcript 
page 140): 
q) Wellf I asked you the question, 
well you have indicated that she was 
standing on the center mark and then 
you answer? 
a) Yes she was standing in the 
middle. I pulled over when I passed 
the car so that if there would be 
anybody standing there or anything. 
I just automatically went in the 
center lane to pass the car that was 
parked on the roadside. 
q) Then I ask the question, your car 
then must have been partly in the 
other lane of traffic, the lane that 
was headed toward Kanab, is that 
right? 
a) A little bit maybe, yes, maybe a 
little bit over. 
q) Then if you will turn to the next 
page I ask the question on line 9, 
but is it a fact that she was on the 
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center line and that your car was 
partly in both lanes? 
a) Yesf I pulled over to my left a 
little bit to pass the vehicle that 
was parked on the roadside ... 
q) Well at the time you first saw 
her and you say you cranked your car 
to the right, how much of your car 
was in oncoming lane of traffic and 
how much was in your own lane of 
traffic? 
a) If I was over then I will say 
maybe a foot, part of the car and 
when I turned I just really turned to 
the right to avoid hitting her. 
It is evident from the foregoing that a jury 
could well have believed the evidence of the 
defendant/respondent that at the time the impact 
occurred with the pedestrian that the pedestrian 
was at or near the center line of the street and 
that Mrs. Smith's car was a foot or so into the 
wrong lane of traffic. Had she been wholly within 
her own lane of traffic, Mrs. Sandoval would be 
alive today. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER DUTY TO NOT 
DRIVE IN THE OPPOSING LANE OF TRAFFIC. 
Both Sections 40-6-54 quoted in Point II 
above and Section 41-6-61 of the Utah Code mandate 
that a vehicle at all times be driven within a 
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single lane of traffic. 41-6-61 says in pertinent 
part: 
Whenever any roadway has been divided 
into two or more clearly marked lanes 
for traffic, the following rules in 
addition to all others consistent 
herewith shall apply: 
1. A vehicle shall be driven as 
nearly as practical entirely within a 
single lane and shall not be moved 
from such lane until the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement 
can be made with safety 777 
(Emphasis added.) 
As applied to the fact situation before the 
Court, whether Mrs. Smith violated that duty was a 
jury question and the Court erred in infringing on 
that duty. See, Apache v. Cheney v. Cowboy Oil 
Company, supra. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT VIOLATED HER STATUTORY 
DUTY AS A VEHICLE DRIVER TO EXERCISE 
DUE CARE AND TO KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT 
(41-6-80 U.C.A.) 
Section 41-6-80 of the Utah Code which deals 
with pedestrian's rights and duties vis-a-vis 
motor vehicles states the duty of the vehicle 
driver when a pedestrian is in the area in the 
following words: 
41-6-80 Notwithstanding other provi-
sions of this chapter or any local 
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ordinance, every driver of a vehicle 
shall exercise due care to avoid 
colliding with any pedestrian or any 
person propelling a human powered 
vehicle and shall give an audible 
signal when necessary and exercise 
proper precaution upon observing any 
child or any obviously confused, 
incapacitated or intoxicated person. 
Only one Utah Supreme Court case has been 
disclosed by research to construe this section. 
That is the case of Rivas v. Pacific Finance, 397 
P. 2d 900. In that case which involved a vehicle 
accident which took the life of a small child 
playing in the street on a sleigh the Court 
correctly held: 
Applying the above rules to the 
evidence as we view it, we agree with 
the conclusion of the trial court 
that there is a basis therein upon 
which reasonable minds could differ 
both as to the negligence of the 
defendant and the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff. Accordingly, 
these questions were properly sub-
mitted to the jury for determination. 
It was improper for the Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the jury under the 
circumstances. 
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POINT V 
VIOLATION OF THE STATUTORY TRAFFIC 
REGULATION CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE 
EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE. 
As a general rule, violation of the standard 
of safety set by a statute or ordinance is prima 
facie evidence of negligence. In commenting on 
this general rule, the Supreme Court in the case 
of Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, a 1981 Utah 
Supreme Court case set forth the following terms 
and conditions under which this rule comes into 
effect (page 850) : 
To invoke the rule, a party must show 
(1) the existence of the statute or 
ordinance, (2) that the statute or 
ordinance was intended to protect the 
class of persons which include the 
party, (3) that the protection is 
directed toward the type of harm 
which has in fact occurred as a 
result of the violation, and (4) that 
the violation of the ordinance or 
statute was a proximate cause of the 
injury complained of. 
It is submitted that based upon the evidence 
placed before the jury that the plaintiff/appel-
lant had met all of those requirements, not once 
but several times. Within the purview of each of 
the statutes quoted above, the jury, based upon 
the only evidence before it at the time, could 
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certainly have found that Mrs. Smith was guilty of 
driving at a speed too fast for the conditions 
then in existence, that she had failed to keep a 
proper lookout and to observe what was clearly to 
be seen, that she failed to drive entirely within 
her own traffic lane and it is submitted that 
keeping a 6-foot wide car within a 12-foot wide 
traffic lane is not really that demanding of a 
driver
 f and that she had negligently allowed her 
car to drift into the opposing lane of traffic 
even though there was an approaching car in that 
lane and that she had driven into an area where 
she should reasonably have anticipated the 
presence of pedestrian traffic and that for 
reasons known only to her she had not observed the 
pedestrian standing waiting for her to pass, but 
had in fact swerved out of her own lane of traffic 
and picked off the stationary pedestrian. 
As the Court stated in Hall v. Warren, 
supra, at page 851: 
The summary judgment in the instant 
case cannot be sustained. The 
allegations, if proven, may support a 
claim in negligence. Moreover, the 
record reveals disputed issues of 
material facts. 
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As in the Hall case, this case should be 
reversed and sent back for a jury determination. 
POINT VI 
THE EVIDENCE WHEN TAKEN IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF 
PRECLUDES THE COURT ENTERING A 
JUDGMENT FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
It is axiomatic that when a court has taken 
the very questionable position of depriving a jury 
of its rightful prerogative to decide contested 
issues of fact that those facts should be taken in 
the light most favorable to the party ruled 
against. This position was so even under earlier 
law pertaining to contributory negligence but now 
that the laws of the State of Utah have done away 
with contributory negligence and have erected in 
its place the law of comparative negligence there 
is ever more reason to let such contested issues 
go to the jury rather than have the judge 
summarily dispose of them. As stated in the case 
of Williams v. Melbyy 699 P.2d 923, a very recent 
1985 decision by the Utah Supreme Court: 
Even though plaintiff may have been 
negligent, summary judgment is an 
altogether inappropriate procedure 
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for assessing her degree of negli-
gence against the negligence of the 
defendants. In the days when contri-
butory negligence was an absolute 
defense in a negligence action, 
summary judgment could be used to 
dispose of negligence actions without 
depriving a plaintiff of his right to 
a trial on the merits. Now, however, 
contributory negligence is not an 
absolute defense, and summary judg-
ment is rarely an appropriate remedy 
for resolving negligence actions. 
(Page 723). 
In another very recent case decided by the 
Supreme Court August 9, 1985, the case Wessel v. 
Erickson, 15 Utah Advance Reports 36 (Supreme 
Court No. 19219) , the Court very clearly 
differentiated between a Rule 41(b) motion which 
permits a court trying a case without a jury to 
grant a Motion to Dismiss at the end of plain-
tiff's case, from a Rule 50(a) motion for a 
directed verdict in a case tried by a jury before 
the Court, at page 37: 
Rule 41(b) permits a Court trying a 
case without a jury to grant a motion 
to dismiss when it concludes 'that 
upon the facts and the law the 
plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. ' 
The trial court is not precluded from 
granting such a motion merely because 
the plaintiff has made out a prima 
facie case. As it is when ruling 
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upon a Rule 50(a) motion for the 
directed verdict in a case tried to a 
jury. See, e.g., Utah State National 
Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 
290-91, 254 P. 781, 784 (1927); Cruz 
v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah, 
1983). 
In Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, the Court 
discussed the function of a directed verdict on 
pages 728 and 729. The Court held, citing many 
cases therein, that in directing a verdict the 
trial court may not weigh the evidence, that the 
Court must consider the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
directed and resolve controverted facts in his 
favor and if the evidence and its inferences would 
cause reasonable men to arrive at different 
conclusions as to whether the essential facts were 
not proved then the question was one of fact for 
the jury. Unless the evidence is wholly lacking 
and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which supports the plaintiff's claim, 
the Court should not direct a verdict for the 
defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that with the evidence being 
for the jury, the Court in the instance before the 
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Bar was wholly in violation of the jury's preroga-
tive and the facts were sufficient to sustain a 
jury determination and the Court was guilty of 
violating these restrictions on its power and 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 2Lo day 
of DaroJbStL , 1985. 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Appellants1 Brief to respondent^ attorneys, Ray 
H. Ivie and Ray Phillips Ivie, at their known 
address 48 North University, P.O. Box 672, Provo, 
Utah 84603; and ten copies to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, 332 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this 
day of &<7TG&r4, , 1985. 
Attorney 
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, T A H CODE 
1983 1986 Motor Vehicles 41-6-46 
nil be prohibited from consuming alcoholic 
averages as provided in subsection (1). 
(5) The provisions of subsection (2) shall not 
apply to passengers traveling in any duly licensed 
taxicab or bus. 
(6) Any person convicted of a violation of this 
section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1981 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles 
by category I peace officers. 
The legislature finds that it is contrary to the 
safety of the public to leave vehicles unattended on 
public roads. 
(1) If a category I peace officer arrests or cites 
the driver of a vehicle for violating Section 41-6-44 
or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to 
Section 41-6-44, which complies with Subsection 41-
6-43(1), the officer shall seize and impound the 
vehicle except as provided under Subsection (2). 
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than 
the driver, is present at the time of arrest, the 
officer may release the vehicle to that registered 
owner, but only if the registered owner: 
(a) requests to remove the vehicle from the 
scene; 
(b) presents to the officer a valid driver's 
license and sufficient identification to prove 
ownership of the vehicle; 
(c) complies with all restrictions of his driver's 
license; and 
(d) would not, in the judgment of the officer, 
be in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or 
a local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44, which 
complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to 
operate the vehicle, and if the vehicle itself is legally 
operable. 
(3) Any officer who impounds.%a vehicle under 
this section shall remove, or cause the vehicle to be 
removed, to the nearest accessible impound yard 
that meets the standards set by rule by the Division 
of Motor Vehicles, or if none, to a garage or some 
other reasonably safe place. The impound yard 
standards set by the Division of Motor Vehicles 
shall be fair and reasonable and shall be unrestrict-
ive as to number of impound yards per geographical 
area. The peace officer or agency by whom the 
officer is employed shall, within 24 hours after the 
seizure, notify the Division of Motor Vehicles of the 
seizure and impoundment. The notice shall set forth 
the driver's name, a description of the vehicle, its 
identification number, if any, its license number, 
the date, time, and place of impoundment, the 
reason for impoundment, and the name of the 
garage or place where the vehicle is stored. 
(4) Upon receipt of notice, the Division of Motor 
Vehicles shall give notice to the registered owner of 
the vehicle in the manner prescribed by Section 41-1-
16. The notice shall set forth the date, time, and 
place of impoundment, the name of the person 
driving the vehicle at the time of seizure, the reason 
for seizure and impoundment, and the name of the 
garage or place where the vehicle is stored. It shall 
also inform the registered owner that the person is 
responsible for payment of towing, impound, and 
storage fees charged against the vehicle. The notice 
shall also inform the registered owner of the vehicle 
of the conditions as prescribed in Subsection (5) 
which must be satisfied before the vehicle can be 
released. 
(5) The impounded vehicle shall be released after 
the registered owner or the owner's agent (a) makes 
a claim in person for release of the vehicle at any 
office of the State Tax Commission, (b) pays an 
impound fee of $25, (c) presents identification suff-
icient to prove ownership of the impounded vehicle, 
and (d) pays all towing and storage fees to the 
impound lot where the vehicle is stored. All 
impound fees assessed under this subsection shall be 
treated as dedicated revenue to the Division of 
Motor Vehicles. 
(6) Any impounded vehicle not claimed by the 
registered owner or the owner's agent within the 
time prescribed by Section 41-1-117 shall be sold in 
accordance with that section and the proceeds, if 
any, disposed o f in accordance with Section 41-1-
117. The date of impoundment is considered the 
date o f seizure for purposes of computing the time 
period provided in Section 41-1-117. 
(7) Towing and storage fees shall be established 
by the Division of Motor Vehicles and shall be 
reviewed by the division annually to ensure equity 
for vehicle owners and towing and storage operato-
rs. Towing, impound, or storage fees are a lien on 
the vehicle. 
(8) The registered owner of the vehicle upon the 
payment of all fees and charges incurred in the 
seizure and impoundment of the owner's vehicle has 
a cause of action for all the fees and charges, 
together with damages, court costs, and attorney 
fees, against the driver o f the vehicle whose actions 
caused the impoundment. 
(9) N o liability may be imposed upon any peace 
officer, the state, or any of its political subdivisions 
on account of the enforcement of this section. 1W4 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
(1) Any person who drives any vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or 
property is guilty o f reckless driving. 
(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving 
shall be punished upon a first conviction, by impris-
onment for a period of not less than five days nor 
more than six months or by a fine of not less than 
$25 nor more than $299, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. On a second or subsequent convicti-
on , the person shall be punished by imprisonment 
for not less than ten days nor more than six 
months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more 
than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
1*71 
Article 6. Speed Restrictions 
41-6-46. Speed regulations - Safe and appropriate speeds 
at intersections, crossings, and curves - Prima fade speed 
limits - Emergency power of the governor. 
41-6-47. Prima facie limit. 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions - Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges - Prima fade 
evidence. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway • 
Barricade or obstruction therefor. 
41-6-52. Violation - Pleading. 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. 
41-6-46. Speed regulations - Safe and appropriate 
speeds at intersections, crossings, and curves -
Prima facie speed limits - Emergency power of the 
governor. 
(1) N o person shall drive a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions and having regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing. Consistent with the 
foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing 
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an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when 
approaching and going around a curve, when appr-
oaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any 
narrow or winding roadway, and when special 
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other 
traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditi-
ons. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following 
speeds shall he lawful but any speed in excess of 
said limits shall be prima facie evidence that the 
speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is 
unlawful: 
(a) Twenty miles per hour. 
When passing a school building or the grounds 
thereof during school recess or while children are 
going to or leaving school during opening or closing 
hours; provided, that local authorities may require a 
complete stop before passing a school building or 
grounds at any of said periods. 
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban 
district. 
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
The speed limits set forth in this section may be 
altered as authorized in subsection (3) and sections 
41-6-47 and 41-6-48. 
(3)" The governor by proclamation, in time of war 
or emergency, may change the speed on the 
highways of the state. vm 
41-6-47. Prima fade limit. 
Whenever the department of transportation shall 
determine upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed her-
einbefore set forth is greater or less than is reason-
able or safe under the conditions found to exist at 
any intersection or other place or upon any part of 
a state highway, said department of transportation 
may determine and declare a reasonable and safe 
prima facie speed limit thereat which shall be 
effective when appropriate signs giving notice are 
erected at such intersection or other place or part of 
the highway. 1979 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions - Powers of local auth-
orities. 
(1) Whenever local authorities in their respective 
jurisdiction determine on the basis of an engineering 
and traffic investigation that the prima facie speed 
permitted under this article is greater or less than is 
reasonable and safe under the conditions found to 
exist upon a highway or part of a highway, the 
local authority may determine and declare a reaso-
nable and safe prima facie limit thereon which: 
(a) Decreases the limit at intersections; or 
(b) Increases the limit within an urban district; 
or 
(c) Decreases the limit outside an urban district, 
but not to less than 35 miles per hour. 
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdicti-
ons shall determine by an engineering and traffic 
investigation the proper prima facie speed for all 
arterial streets and shall declare a reasonable and 
safe prima facie limit thereon which may be greater 
or less than the prima facie speed permitted under 
this chapter for an urban district. 
(3) Any altered limit established as herein above 
authorized shall be effective when appropriate signs 
giving notice thereof are erected upon such street or 
highway. 
(4) The department Of transportation shall have 
exclusive authority to determine and declare prima 
facie evidence of a lawful speed on state highways 
whether such highways be within or without the 
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corporate limits of any city. i ^ 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
(1) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such 
a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and 
reasonable movement of traffic except when: 
(a) Reduced speed is necessary for safe operati* 
on; 
* (b) Upon a grade; 
(c) Reduced speed is necessary because of 
adverse weather conditions; 
(d) In compliance with official traffic control 
devices; or 
(e) Preparing to turn left or enter a left lane 
exit ramp. 
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled 
access highway at less than the lawful maximum 
speed side by side with and at the same speed as a 
vehicle operated in the adjacent right lane constitu-
tes evidence of impeding or blocking normal 
movement of traffic. 
(3) Whenever the department of transportation or 
local authorities within their respective jurisdictions 
determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that slow speeds on any part of t 
highway consistently impede the normal and reaso-
nable movement of traffic, the department of tran-
sportation or such local authority may determine 
and shall post a minimum speed limit below which 
no person shall drive a vehicle except when 
necessary for safe operation. 
(4) A violat ion of this sect ion is a class B misde-
meanor . 19*3 
41-6-50. Special speed limit o n br idges • Prima 
fade evidence. 
(1) No person shall drive a vehicle over any 
bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part 
of a highway at a speed which is greater than the 
maximum speed which can be maintained with 
safety to such bridge or structure, when such 
structure is signposted as provided in this section. 
* (2) The department of transportation upon 
request from any local authority shall, or upon its 
own initiative, may conduct an investigation of any 
bridge or other elevated structure constituting a part 
of a highway, and if it finds that such structure 
cannot with safety withstand vehicles traveling at 
the speed otherwise permissible under this chapter, 
the department of transportation shall determine 
and declare the maximum speed of vehicles which 
such structure can withstand, and shall cause or 
permit suitable signs stating such maximum speed to 
be erected and maintained before each end of such 
structure. 
(3) Upon the trial of any person charged with a 
violation of this, section, proof of said determinat-
ion of the maximum speed by the department of 
transportation and the existence of said signs shall 
constitute conclusive evidence of the maximum 
speed which can be maintained with safety to such 
bridge or structure. i97t 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway * 
Barricade or obstruction therefor. 
(a) No person shall engage in any motor vehicle 
speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway 
and no person shall aid or abet in any such motor 
vehicle speed contest or exhibition on any highway. 
(b) No person shall, for the purpose of facilitat-
ing or aiding or as an incident to any motor vehicle 
speed contest upon a highway, in any manner 
obstruct or place any barricade or obstruction or 
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assist or participate in placing any such barricade or 
obstruction upon any highway. 1*53 
41-6-52. Violation - Pleading. 
(a) In every charge of violation of any speed reg-
ulation in this act the complaint, also the summons 
or notice to appear, shall specify the speed at which 
the defendant is alleged to have driven, also the 
prima facie speed applicable within the district or at 
the location. 
(b) The provisions of this act declaring prima 
facie speed limitations shall not be construed to 
relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the 
burden o f proving negligence on the part of the 
defendant as the proximate cause of an accident. 1953 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. 1975 
Article 1. Regulations Applicable to 
Driving on Right Side of Highway, Ove-
rtaking, Passing and Other Rules of the 
Road 
41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway - Excepti-
ons. 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in 
same direction. 
41-6-56. Passing upon right - When permissible. 
41-6-57. Limitation on passing. 
41-6-58. Limitations on driving on left side of road - Exc-
eptions. 
41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway - No passing 
zones - Exceptions. 
41-6-60. One-way traffic -Signs. 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes - Rules -
Traffic-control devices. 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle - Proximity and 
' distance - Caravan or motorcade - Exception for funeral 
procession. 
41-6-63. Repealed. 
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways 
by dividing section - Unlawful actions of drivers -
Dividing-section defined and described. 
41-6-64. Controlled-access highways - Driving upon and 
from highways. 
41-6-65. Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by 
class or kind of traffic - Traffic-control devices. 
41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway • 
Exceptions. 
(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width a 
vehicle shall be driven upon the right half o f the 
roadway, except as follows: 
(1) When overtaking and passing another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the 
rules governing such movement; 
(2) When an obstruction exists making it 
necessary to drive to the left of the center o f the 
roadway; provided any person so doing shall yield 
the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the 
proper direction upon the unobstructed portions o f 
the highway within such distance as to constitute an 
immediate hazard; 
(3) U p o n a roadway divided into three marked 
lanes for traffic under the rules applicable thereon; 
or 
(4) Upon a roadway designed and signposted 
for one-way traffic. 
(b) U p o n all roadways any vehicle proceeding at 
less than the normal speed of traffic at the time and 
place under the conditions then existing shall be 
driven in the right-hand lane then available for 
traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand 
curb or edge of the roadway, except when overtak-
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same direction or when preparing for a left turn at 
an intersection or into a private road or driveway. 
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41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite 
directions. 
Drivers o f vehicles proceeding in opposite directi-
ons shall pass each other to the right and upon 
roadways having width for not more than one line 
o f traffic in each direction, each driver shall give to 
the other at least one-half of the main traveled 
portion o f the roadway as nearly as possible. 1953 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceed-
ing in same direction. 
The following rules govern the overtaking and 
passing o f vehicles proceeding in the same direction, 
subject to the following provisions: 
(1) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass 
to the left at a safe distance and may not again 
drive to the right side of the roadway until safely 
clear o f the overtaken vehicle. 
(2) The driver o f an overtaken vehicle shall give 
way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle 
and may not increase the speed of his vehicle until 
completely passed by the overtaking vehicle. 
(3) On a road having more than one lane in the 
same direction, the driver of a vehicle traveling in a 
left lane shall, upon being overtaken by another 
vehicle in the same lane, yield to the over-taking 
vehicle by moving safely to the right, and may not 
impede the movement or free flow o f traffic in a 
left lane except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction under the rules 
governing this movement; 
(b) when preparing to turn left; 
(c) when reasonably necessary in response t o 
emergency conditions; 
(d) to avoid actual or potential traffic moving 
onto the right lane from an acceleration or merging 
lane; or 
(e) when necessary to follow the highway 
direction signs that direct use of a lane other than 
the right lane. 
(4) Violation of this section is a class B misdeme-
anor, lfts 
41-6-56. Passing upon right - When permissible. 
(1) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass 
upon the right of another vehicle only under the 
following conditions: 
(a) When the vehicle overtaken is making or 
about to make a left turn; 
(b) Upon a roadway with unobstructed 
pavement of sufficient width for two or more lines 
of vehicles moying lawfully in the direction being 
traveled by the overtaking vehicle; 
(c) Upon a one-way street, or upon any 
roadway on which traffic is restricted to one 
direction of movement, where the roadway is free 
from obstructions and of sufficient width for two 
or more lines of moving vehicles. 
(2) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass 
another vehicle upon the right only under conditions 
permitting such movement with safety. Such 
movement shall not be made by driving of f the 
roadway. 1971 
41-6-57. Limitation on passing. 
N o vehicle shall be driven to the left side o f the 
center o f the roadway in overtaking or passing 
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another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of 
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to 
permit such overtaking and passing to be completely 
made without interfering with the operation of any 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction of 
any vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking 
vehicle must return to an authorized lane of travel 
as soon as practical and in the event that the 
passing movement involves the use of a lane autho-
rized for vehicles approaching in the opposite 
direction before coming within 200 feet of any 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. 1975 
41-6-58. Limitations on driving on left side of road 
- Exceptions. 
(a) No vehicle shall at any time be driven on the 
left side of the roadway under the following condit-
ions: 
(1) When approaching or upon a crest of a 
grade or a curve on the highway where the driver's 
view is obstructed within such distance as to create 
a hazard in the event another vehicle might 
approach from the opposite direction. 
(2) When approaching within 100 feet of or 
traversing any intersection or railroad grade 
crossing. 
(3) When the view is obstructed upon approac-
hing vithin 100 feet of any bridge, viaduct, or 
tunnel. 
(b) The foregoing limitations shall not apply upon 
a one-way roadway, nor under the conditions 
described in section 41-6-53(a)(2) nor to the driver 
of a vehicle turning left onto or from an alley, 
private road or driveway. ins 
41-6-59. Signs and markings on roadway • No 
passing zones - Exceptions. 
(1) The department of transportation and local 
authorities are authorized to determine those 
portions of any highway under their respective juri-
sdictions where overtaking and passing or driving 
on the left of the roadway would be especially 
hazardous and may by appropriate signs or 
markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and 
end of such zones and when such signs or markings 
are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily 
observant person every driver of a vehicle shall obey 
the directions thereof. 
(2) Where signs or markings are in place to define 
a no-pa. sing zone as set forth in paragraph (1), no 
driver shall at any time drive on the left side of the 
roadway within such no-passing zone or on the left 
side of any pavement striping designed to mark 
such no-passing zone throughout its lengths. 
(3) This section does not apply to the conditions 
described in section 41-6-53(a)(2) nor to the driver 
of a vehicle turning left ontp or from an alley, 
private road or driveway. I*TI 
41-6-60. One-way traffic - Signs. 
(a) The department of transportation and local 
authorities may designate any highway, roadway, 
part of a roadway or specific lanes under their res-
pective jurisdictions upon which vehicular traffic 
shall proceed in one direction at all or such time as 
shall be indicated by official traffic-control devices. 
(b) Upon a roadway so designated for one-way 
traffic, a vehicle shall be driven only in the 
direction indicated by official traffic-control 
devices. 
(c) A vehicle passing around a rotary' traffic 
island shall be driven only to the right of such 
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island. ^ 
41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes • 
Rules - Traffic-control devices. 
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two 
or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the 
following rules in addition to all others consistent 
herewith shall apply: 
,(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical 
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved 
from such lane until the driver has first ascertained 
that such movement can be made with safety. 
(2) Upon a roadway which is divided into three 
lanes and provides for two-way movement of 
traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center 
lane except when overtaking and passing another 
vehicle traveling in the same direction when such 
center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, 
or in preparation of making or completing a left 
turn or where such center lane is at the time 
allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same 
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such al-
location is designated by official traffic-control 
devices. 
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected 
directing specified traffic to use a designated lane or 
designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving 
in a particular direction regardless of the center of 
the roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the 
directions of every such device. itn 
41-6-62. Following another vehicle - Proximity and 
distance - Caravan or motorcade - Exception for . 
funeral procession. 
(1) The driver of a vehicle shall not follow 
another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and 
prudent, having due regard for the speed of such 
vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition o f 
the highway. 
(2) The driver of any truck or motor vehicle 
drawing another vehicle when traveling upon a 
roadway outside of a business or residence district 
and which is following another truck or motor 
vehicle drawing another vehicle shall, whenever 
conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an 
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy such space 
without danger, except that this shall not prevent a 
truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle from 
overtaking and passing any vehicle or combinations 
of vehicles. 
(3) Motor vehicles being driven upon any 
roadway outside of a business or residence district 
in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing 
other vehicles shall be so operated as to allow suff-
icient space between each such vehicle or combinat-
ion of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle to 
enter and occupy such space without danger. This 
provision shall not apply to funeral processions, ms 
41-6-63. Repealed. 1975 
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate 
roadways by dividing section - Unlawful actions of 
drivers - Dividing section defined and described. 
Whenever a highway has been divided into two 
separate roadways by a dividing section, it shall be 
unlawful to drive any vehicle upon any such 
highway except to the right of such dividing section, 
or to drive any vehicle over, upon, or across any 
such dividing section or to make any left turn or 
semicircular oir U-turn on any such divided 
highway, except through a plainly marked opening 
in such dividing section designed and designated for 
such left turn, semicircular or U-turn, unless a sign 
- _ — — 
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lanes into which the lane of the driver is merging 
and which are so close as to be an immediate 
hazard. This section shall not apply to entry lanes 
to limited access highways. i*gj 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Duties of respective 
drivers. 
(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authori-
zed emergency vehicle making use of audible and 
visual signals meeting the requirements of this act, 
or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making 
use of an audible signal only, the driver of every 
other vehicle shall yield the right of way and shall 
immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as 
close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of 
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop 
and remain in such position until the authorized 
emergency vehicle has passed, except when 
otherwise directed by a police officer. 
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the 
duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all 
persons using the highway. 1*75 
41-5-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon 
highway - Right of way. 
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of 
way to any authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually 
engaged in work upon a highway within any 
highway construction or maintenance area indicated 
by official traffic-control devices. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of 
way to any authorized vehicle obviously and 
actually engaged in work upon a highway whenever 
such vehicle displays lights meeting the requirements 
of section 41-6-140.20. 197s 
Article 10. Pedestrians9 Rights and Duties 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices -
Other controls. 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right of way. 
41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle • Duties of driver and ped-
estrian. 
41-6-79.20. Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or 
barrier prohibited. 
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians 
and human-powered vehicles • Audible signals to be 
given. 
41-6-80.1. Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons • 
Exceptions • Use of cane • Liability. 
41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk - Driver to yield. 
41-6-81. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks. 
41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways • Standing in 
roadway for prohibited purposes • Yielding right of way 
to vehicles - Pedestrians under the influence. 
41-6-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations - Restrictions 
on pedestrian. 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control 
devices - Other controls. 
(1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any 
official traffic-control device specifically applicable 
to such pedestrian unless otherwise directed by a 
police officer. 
(2) Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic and pe-
destrian-control signals as provided in sections 64-6-
24 [41-6-24J and 41-6-25. 
(3) At all other places, pedestrians shall be 
accorded the privileges and be subject to the restri-
ctions stated in this chapter. 197* 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. 
(l)(a) When traffic-control signals are not in 
place or not in operation the driver of a vehicle 
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shall yield the right of way, slowing down or 
stopping if necessary to yield, to a pedestrian 
crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the 
pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon 
which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestr-
ian is approaching so closely from the opposite half 
of the roadway as to be in danger. 
(b) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or 
other place of safety and walk or run into the path 
of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. Paragraph (l)(a) shall not apply 
under the conditions stated in section 41-6-79(2). 
(2) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked 
crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an inte-
rsection to permit a pedestrian to cross the 
roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approach-
ing from the rear shall not overtake and pass such 
stopped vehicle. 1*78 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right of way. 
(1) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any 
point other than within a marked crosswalk or 
within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the 
roadway. 
(2) Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point 
where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian 
crossing has been provided shall yield the right of 
way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-
control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall 
not cross at any place except in a marked crosswa-
lk. 
(4) No pedestrian shall cross a roadway intersect-
ion diagonally unless authorized by official traffic-
control devices; and, when authorized to cross dia-
gonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance 
with the official traffic-control devices pertaining to 
such crossing movements. 1978 
41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle - Duties of driver 
and pedestrian. 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authori-
zed emergency vehicle making use of an audible 
signal meeting the requirements of section 41-6-146, 
and visual signals meeting the requirements of 
section 41-6-14 or section 41-6-140, or of a police 
vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an 
audible signal, every pedestrian shall yield the right 
of way to the authorized emergency vehicle. 
(2) This section shall not relieve the driver of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive 
with regard for the safety of all persons using the 
highway, nor from the duty to exercise due care to 
avoid colliding with any pedestrian. 1978 
41-6-79.20. Passing dosed railroad or bridge gate 
or barrier prohibited. 
No pedestrian shall pass through, around, over or 
under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad 
crossing or bridge while such gate or barrier is 
closed or is being opened or closed. 1975 
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid ped-
estrians and human-powered vehicles - Audible 
signals to be given. 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter 
or any local ordinance, every driver of a vehicle 
shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any 
pedestrian or any person propelling a human 
powered vehicle and shall give an audible signal 
when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon 
observing any child or any obviously confused, inc-
apacitated or intoxicated person. 1971 
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bate* - Requirements. 
41-4-153. Warning signal around disabled vehicle - Time 
and place. 
41-4-154. Hazardous materials - Transportation regulati-
ons - fire extinguishers. 
41-4-154.10. Air conditioning equipment - Requirements. 
41-4-154.20. Television receivers In motor vehicles prohibi-
ted if driver can see viewing screen - Exception. 
41-4-154.50. Motorcycles - Required' equipment • Brakes. 
,41-4-155. Vehicles and equipment must be in safe mechan-
ical condition. 
41-4-154. Inspection by officers - Certificate of inspection. 
41-4-157. Enforcement of inspection requirements. 
41-4-158. Periodic inspection required • Display of inspec-
tion sticker required. 
41-4-159. Suspension of registration. 
41-4-140. Official inspection stations - Permits - Suspens-
ion or revocation • Utah-based interstate commercial 
motor carriers. 
41-4-140.5. Hearing board created - Members - Term -
Meetings - Findings and conclusions • Order. 
41-4-141. Permits not transferable - Certificate of inspect-
ion-Fees. 
41-4-142. Falsely representing to be official station. 
41-4-143. Counterfeit certificates of Inspection. 
41-4-143.5. Emissions inspection - Automatic repealer. 
41-4-143.4. Fmtesioas inspection - County program. 
41-4444. Violation of act - Misdemeanor. 
41-4-144.5. Violation of chapter. 
41-4-145. Requiring or knowingly permitting driver to unl-
awfully operate vehicle. 
41-4-145.5. Government owned vehicles subject to this 
chapter. 
41-4-144. Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor -
Setting bond. 
41-4-147. Notice to appear in court • Contents - Promise 
. to comply ° Signing • Release from custody • Official 
misconduct. 
41-4-148. Violation of promise to appear as misdemeanor -
Appearance by counsel. 
41-6449. Arrests without warrants. 
41-4-149.10. Repealed. 
41-4-170. Record of violation not admissible In civil 
41-4-171. Conviction shall not affect credibility as a 
witness. 
41-4-172. Improper disposition or cancellation of notice to 
appear or traffic citation • Official misconduct -> Misde-
41-4-173. Keeping of records • Making and forwarding of 
abstract upon conviction or forfeiture of bail - Form and 
contents - Public inspection - Official misconduct. 
41-4-174. Repealed. 
41-4-175. Short title of act. 
41-4-175.5. Conflict with Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations. 
41-4-174. Odometer required. 
41-4-177. Unlawful acts with respect to operation of 
odometer. 
414-178. Statement as to odometer reading required of 
transferor. 
41-4-179. Repair or replacement of odometer. 
41-4-180. Violation of odometer requirements as misdeme-
41-6-117. Vehicle In unsafe condition or improperly 
equipped - Violation of act » Misdemeanor - Acce-
ssories - Exception as to farm implements and road 
machinery. 
(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive or 
move or for the owner to cause or knowingly 
permit to be driven or moved on any highway any 
vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in such 
unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or 
which does not contain those parts or is not at all 
times equipped with such lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and adjustment as 
required in this chapter or in regulations issued by 
the department, or which is equipped in any manner 
in violation of this chapter or those regulations or 
for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to 
perform any act required under this chapter or 
those regulations. 
(b) Nothing in this chapter or regulations of the 
department shall prohibit equipment required by the 
United States Department of Transportation nor the 
use of additional parts and accessories on any 
vehicle not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
chapter or those regulations. 
(c) The provisions of this chapter and regulations 
of the department, with respect to equipment 
required on vehicles, shall not apply to implements 
of husbandry, road machinery, road rollers or farm 
tractors, except as specifically made applicable* 
(d) The provisions of this chapter and regulations 
of the department with respect to equipment 
required on vehicles shall not apply to motorcycles 
or motor-driven cycles, except as specifically made 
applicable. 
(e) The provisions of this chapter and regulations 
of the department shall not apply to vehicles moved 
solely by human power, except as specifically made 
applicable. 
(0 A federal motor vehicle safety standard which 
conflicts with L provision of this act shall supersede 
that provision as to any vehicle in compliance with 
the federal standard. The department shall report 
any such conflict to the appropriate committees or 
officials of the legislature and may adopt a regulat-
ion to replace the superseded provision. vm 
41-6-117.5. Permit to operate vehicle in violation of 
equipment regulations. 
(a) The department may issue a permit which will 
allow operation of a vehicle in violation of the pro-
visions of this chapter or in violation of departme-
ntal regulations. 
(b) The permit shall be carried by the driver or in 
the vehicle and shall be displayed upon demand of a 
magistrate or police officer. 
(c) In issuing such permits, the department may 
limit the time, manner or duration of operation and 
may otherwise prescribe conditions of operation 
that are necessary to protect the safety of highway 
users or efficient movement of traffic. Said conditi-
ons shall be stated on the permit and a person shall 
not violate them. ir» 
41-6-118. lights and illuminating devices - Duty to 
display - Time. 
(a) Every vehicle upon a highway within this statt 
at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half 
hour before sunrise and at any other time when, 
due to insufficient light or unfavorable atmospheric 
conditions, persons and vehicles on the highway art 
not clearly discernible at a distance of 1,000 feel 
ahead shall display lighted lamps and other lamps 
and illuminating devices as respectively required foi 
different classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions 
with respect to parked vehicles, and further tha 
stop lights, turn signals and other signaling device 
shall be lighted as prescribed for the use of sucl 
devices. 
(b) Whenever requirement is hereinafter declare* 
as to distance from which certain lamps and device 
shall render objects visible or within which sucl 
lamps or devices shall be visible, said provision 
shall apply during the times stated in subdivision (a 
in respect to a vehicle without load when upon J 
straight, level, unlighted highway under norma 
atmospheric conditions, unless a different time o 
condition is expressly stated. 
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